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Non-Technical Summary
The results a student obtains in examinations at the end of school to a large
extent determine her future labour market or academic career. Because of this
importance, and since students from disadvantaged ethnical or social backgrounds
typically fare worse in formal tests of academic achievement, some observers argue
against tough testing and grading policies so as not to expose the disadvantage
of such students to employers and/or further education institutions.
Addressing this debate, the present paper examines the relationship between
grades, social origin, and the labour market. It provides a game theoretic model
describing the matching of workers of different abilities to different jobs. The
role of grades in this context is to inform employers about the ability of workers.
The paper shows that, if grades honestly reveal abilities, in equilibrium the most
able workers are matched to the most demanding jobs. Moreover, compared to
applicants with a mediocre grade, applicants with a good grade obtain a wage
premium which reflects the productivity differential and the relative scarcity of
workers with differering abilities. If, however, the school inflates grades by award-
ing good grades to some low ability students, then the matching of jobs and
workers is not only determined by ability but also by social background: The
best jobs are then reserved to highly graded students originating from the upper
social classes. In addition, these students are paid an additional wage premium
which students from lower social classes with a good grade do not obtain. These
results arise from the fact that grade inflation reduces the informational content
of grades, thereby inducing employers to use an unfavourable background as an
additional signal for low ability.
In further results, it is examined how this effect determines the preferences for
grading policies in the student population. It is shown that the aggregate wage
sum received by workers from the disadvantaged social class strictly decreases
if grades are inflated. Moreover, high ability students from the favoured social
origin, whom one might call the “elite”, may indeed prefer grade inflation to
honest grading. This may be worthwhile since with inflated grades, able students
from disadvantaged backgrounds cannot signal their ability anymore, and so can
compete less successfully for the most attractive jobs, leaving more of those for
the students from favoured backgrounds.
For education policy, these results suggest that lenient standards in schools are
not a suitable instrument for promoting upward social mobility. Quite the con-
trary, a strictly meritocratic schooling system which administers tough tests and
grades poor performance honestly might be the best way to promote the prospects
of able, aspiring students from disadvantaged backgrounds.
Zusammenfassung
Schulnoten entscheiden u¨ber die Verteilung von beruflichen Chancen. Dies ist
besonders fu¨r Schu¨ler aus sozial schwachen Familien bedeutsam, da sie bei Leis-
tungstests typischerweise schlechter abschneiden als der Durchschnitt. Aus diesem
Grund wird gelegentlich eine Absenkung von Pru¨fungsstandards gefordert, um so
der mit schlechten Noten oder einem Schulabbruch verbundenen Stigmatisierung
zu begegnen. Auf der anderen Seite wird oftmals beklagt, dass gute Noten und
akademische Abschlu¨sse heute zu leicht erreichbar sind, dass also Noten im Laufe
der Zeit gleichsam “inflationiert” worden sind.
In diesem Spannungsfeld untersucht der vorliegende Beitrag den Zusammenhang
von Noten, sozialer Herkunft und dem Arbeitsmarkt. Dazu wird ein spielthe-
oretisches Modell pra¨sentiert, das die Zuordnung von Arbeitskra¨ften mit ver-
schiedenen Fa¨higkeiten auf unterschiedlich anspruchsvolle Arbeitspla¨tze abbildet.
Auf diesem Markt haben Noten die Funktion, die Arbeitgeber u¨ber den Leistungs-
stand der Bewerber zu informieren. Wenn Noten die Fa¨higkeiten wahrheitsgema¨ß
widergeben, dann werden die anspruchsvollsten Arbeitspla¨tze mit den besten Ar-
beitskra¨ften besetzt. Wenn Noten dagegen in dem Sinne inflationiert werden, dass
auch einige weniger fa¨hige Absolventen gute Noten erhalten, dann sind die at-
traktivsten Arbeitspla¨tze denjenigen Absolventen vorbehalten, die nicht nur u¨ber
eine gute Note, sondern auch u¨ber eine privilegierte Herkunft verfu¨gen. Diese Ar-
beitskra¨fte erhalten zudem einen ho¨heren Lohn als die Arbeitnehmer aus sozial
schwachen Schichten, auch wenn diese dieselbe gute Note erzielt haben. Diese
Ergebnisse beruhen darauf, dass Noteninflation den Informationsgehalt der Noten
verringert und Arbeitgeber deshalb die soziale Herkunft als weiteres, informatives
Signal nutzen, um die Fa¨higkeiten der Bewerber einzuscha¨tzen.
Auf Grund dieses Wirkungszusammenhangs nimmt die an Arbeitskra¨fte aus benach-
teiligten Schichten fließende Lohnsumme mit zunehmender Noteninflation ab.
Daru¨ber hinaus ist es mo¨glich, dass fa¨hige Schu¨ler aus gehobenen Schichten, die
“Elite”, Noteninflation gegenu¨ber einer wahrheitsgema¨ßen Benotung bevorzu-
gen. Eine solche Notenvergabe macht es na¨mlich guten Schu¨lern aus sozial
schwachen Verha¨ltnissen unmo¨glich, ihre Fa¨higkeiten auf dem Arbeitsmarkt zu
signalisieren, so dass sie nicht mehr mit den Schu¨lern aus gehobenen Schichten
um die begehrtesten Arbeitspla¨tze konkurrieren ko¨nnen.
Aus bildungspolitischer Sicht bedeuten diese Ergebnisse, dass nachsichtige Beno-
tung und reduzierte Pru¨fungsanforderungen nicht geeignet sind, um gesellschaftliche
Mobilita¨t zu fo¨rdern. Im Gegenteil, fa¨hige, aufstrebende Schu¨ler aus schwierigem
sozialem Umfeld haben in einem meritokratischen Schulsystem, das Leistungen
ernsthaft pru¨ft und die erzielten Ergebnisse ungescho¨nt dokumentiert, die besten
Chancen.
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Abstract
A model is presented where workers of differing abilities and from dif-
ferent social backgrounds are assigned to jobs based on grades received at
school. It is examined how this matching is affected if good grades are
granted to some low ability students. Such grade inflation is shown to
reduce the aggregate wage of the lower class workers because employers
use social origin as a signal for productivity if grades are less than fully
informative. Moreover, the high-ability students from the higher class may
benefit from grade inflation since this shields them from the competition
on the part of able students from the lower classes.
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1 Introduction
For many students, examinations are the most important aspect of schooling,
and many of them feel substantial pressure to improve the grades they obtain in
such examinations. This attitude is most pronounced when examination results
have immediate and important consequences for the student such as failure to
graduate from high school, as is the case under the policy of “high stakes test-
ing” in many U.S. states. Because of this impact on students’ well-being, some
observers have reservations about tough examination and grading standards. For
example, the California Teachers Association suggests to complement the cur-
rent California High School Exit Exam by “parallel forms of assessment” such
as “essays and personal communications” (see California Teachers Association,
2006). This should allow to reduce the rate of students failing in the assessment
which is considered to be excessive. Similarly, the union of German teachers
GEW demands abolishing quantitative grades for young pupils on the grounds
that they discourage students (see Gewerkschaft Erziehung und Wissenschaft,
2006). In addition to the general impact of tough standards on all students, it is
specifically feared that students from disadvantaged backgrounds are hurt dispro-
portionately by tough examination standards. This concern is rooted in the fact
that, on average, students from poor, minority, or immigrant families perform
less well in tests (see Madaus and Clarke, 2001). As a consequence, one might
think that softening the grading scheme or lowering graduation standards will
improve the opportunities of these students. While these considerations suggest
that examination standards are too tough, the opposite view is also expressed.
Proponents of this view complain that good grades are awarded too easily so
that employers and further education institutions cannot count on the qualifica-
tion of a candidate with a good grade. Specifically, there seems to be widespread
belief that such a practice, which is labelled “grade inflation”, occurs routinely
at the university level, even at the most prestigious institutions (see for example
Mansfield, 2001, and Spiegel online, 2007).
Addressing this debate, the present paper examines the relationship between
grades, social origin, and the labour market. It serves two purposes. First, on
a rather fundamental level, a model is presented which allows to analyse in a
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natural way the role of grades for the allocation on the labour market. This
model is a continuous version of the two-sided matching model introduced by
Roth and Sotomayor (1990), and later used, for example, by Cole, Mailath, and
Postlewaite (1992), Corneo and Gru¨ner (2000), and Clark and Kanbur (2004) in
the context of social interaction. Following these contributions, the concept of
a stable assignment is used to describe the allocation on the labour market. In
a stable assignment, the matching between firms and workers and the resulting
payoffs are such that no agent strictly prefers to stay alone, and such that no
pair consisting of a firm and a worker can improve on their payoffs by matching
together.
In the model presented here, there are workers of high and low ability. The
central feature of the model is that workers with high ability, while being more
productive than low-ability workers on every job, have a comparative advantage
on the most demanding jobs. Thus, the labour market should match the most
able workers with the most productive jobs and allocate the less demanding jobs
to workers with lower ability. In such a context, grades serve an obvious infor-
mation function by signalling ability to firms. To reflect the concern about the
informational content of grades mentioned above, a very simple form of grade
inflation is introduced which consists of awarding a good grade (an “A”) to a
fraction of low ability students. The matching of workers to firms and the re-
sulting wages in a stable assignment are characterised as a function of the extent
of grade inflation. It is shown that the wage premium earned by students with
an A relative to those who carry the lower grade B is eroded by grade inflation.
While this effect hurts able students, grade inflation allows low ability students
to grasp this “grade premium” with a certain probability, and so is beneficial for
these students.
The second central theme of the paper is the impact of grade inflation on the
job prospects of socially disadvantaged students. To analyse this issue, students
are modelled to belong to two social classes, with the share of high ability stu-
dents being higher in the favoured class. This assumption reflects the stylised
fact, well documented by many empirical studies (see, for example, Ermisch and
Francesconi, 2001, Blanden and Gregg, 2004, and Wo¨ssmann, 2008), that stu-
dents’ performance and academic achievement are strongly influenced by family
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background. It is worth noting that it is not relevant for the present analysis
whether this fact is due to a biased school system, insufficient resources, in-
adequate parenting, inherited genetic endowments, or any other cause (for an
empirical analysis of economic vs. natural causes of scholarly achievement, see
Plug and Vijverberg, 2003). Rather, the paper takes abilities as they occur at
the time of the examination as given. Addressing the concern, mentioned above,
that lower class students, on average, fare worse in tests at this age, the paper
then asks whether such students benefit from reducing the information content
of grades. This is not the case, however, as long as social origin is observable. In-
deed, it is shown that the aggregate wage received by lower class workers is strictly
decreasing in the extent of grade inflation. The reason is that, when grades do
not fully reveal true abilities, employers use social origin as an additional source
of information to update their beliefs about the expected productivity of a po-
tential worker. With grade inflation, employers therefore discount the value of
grade A earned by a lower-class student relative to the same grade earned by a
higher-class student. Put differently, grade inflation induces firms to statistically
discriminate against applicants from disfavoured origins.
The analysis shows that in a stable assignment, this effect results in a second wage
premium, the “social premium”, which is paid to A-students from the favourable
social origin but not to lower-class A-students. In further results, it is examined
how the grade premium and the social premium together determine the prefer-
ences for grading policies in the student population, and possible voting outcomes
are discussed. Specifically, it is shown that high ability students from the favoured
social origin, whom one might call the “elite”, may indeed prefer grade inflation
so as to secure the social premium. This may be worthwhile since with inflated
grades, able students from disadvantaged backgrounds cannot signal their abil-
ity anymore, and so can compete less successfully for the most attractive jobs,
leaving more of those for the students from favoured backgrounds.
By addressing the link between degrees and the labour market, the paper con-
tributes both to labour economics and to the economics of education. In labour
economics, it has long been recognised that the assignment of workers to tasks
affects wages (see the survey by Sattinger, 1993). For example, Teulings (1995)
and Costrell and Loury (2004) provide general equilibrium models where, similar
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to the approach used here, high-ability workers have a comparative advantage in
performing demanding jobs. As a main feature of assignment models, which the
present paper shares, these contributions show that the wage differential obtained
by high-ability workers does not only reflect productivity differences on any given
job but depends on the matching between workers and tasks. Moreover, the as-
signment and the wages are affected by the information employers have about
workers of different types. If such information is incomplete, by consequence,
statistical discrimination affects the labour market outcome (see, for example,
Coate and Loury, 1993, Norman, 2003, and Bjerk, 2008), just as in the present
paper. To this literature, the present paper adds by highlighting the importance
of school leaving grades and social origin for the matching and the wages obtained
in equilibrium. It shows that different subgroups of the population are differently
affected by the statistical discrimination introduced by grade inflation, thereby
changing political preferences concerning the grading scheme to be employed.
The paper so points out that the equilibrium assignment on the labour market
may feed back into the schooling system.
An issue which raises concerns similar to those expressed about tough school
leaving examinations are formal tests of job applicants administered by the em-
ployer. In an empirical study of the hiring decisions of a large retailing firm,
Autor and Scarborough (2008) provide an analysis of the effects of such tests.
They show that in this firm, as one might have expected, minority applicants
fare worse than average in formal tests. However, introducing such tests did not
decrease the chances of members of these groups to be hired. This result is due to
an effect similar to the one analysed in the present paper: Like truthful grading,
the formal test provides valuable information about the abilities of individuals
and so reduces the scope for statistical discrimination against minority appli-
cants. Thus, the result by Autor and Scarborough (2008) lends some empirical
support for the theory laid out here. Its conceptual framework, however, is rather
different, and arguably somewhat narrower, than the model presented here. In
describing only the selection of workers for one type of job, these authors do not
address the issue of assigning different workers to different tasks which is central
to the present contribution. Moreover, contrary to Autor and Scarborough who
focus on a single firm, the present approach endogenises wages in an equilibrium
framework and so can explain wage differentials across grades and social origins.
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In the theoretical research on education, grading policies so far have received
rather little attention. In several classical contributions, Betts (1998a) and
Costrell (1994, 1997) develop a model where grades are used to provide incen-
tives for students so as to exert effort at school. This model has been extended
by Himmler and Schwager (2007) who show that the social composition of a
school determines its grading policy. In Ju¨rges, Richter, and Schneider (2005),
the role of testing is to provide incentives for teachers rather than for students.
Finally, Chan, Hao, and Suen (2007) provide a signalling model where grade
inflation affects the assignment of workers to tasks, and where grade inflation
occurs in equilibrium as a result of cheap talk. To this model, the present paper
adds a game theoretic foundation of the equilibrium assignment on the labour
market. Moreover, both papers differ with regard to the information structure
used. While Chan, Hao, and Suen (2007) focus on the asymmetric information
between schools and firms regarding the grading scheme, in the present paper,
the interaction of grades and social origin as signals of ability is at the centre of
the analysis. Altogether, the specific contribution to education economics offered
by the the present paper consists in clarifying the role of grades and social origin
for the allocation on the labour market.
The paper is organised in the usual way: The model is presented in Section 2.
In the following Section 3, the stable assignment on the labour market is charac-
terised. Section 4 contains the results on the interaction of grade inflation and the
wages received by the different subgroups of workers. Section 5 summarises and
offers some lines for future research. Longer proofs are collected in the Appendix.
2 The Model
The model describes a labour market with a continuum of firms each of which
offers one job and a continuum of workers. The sets of firms and workers are
modelled as adjacent intervals on the real line, with i ∈ [0,M) denoting firms,
j ∈ [M,M +N) denoting workers, and k ∈ [0,M + N) being used for an agent
of unspecified role. The lengths M > 0 and N , 0 < N < M , of the intervals are
the Lebesgue-measures of the sets of workers and firms.
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Workers. Workers are characterised by their skill, or ability, s ∈ {a, b},
with a (b) denoting the higher (lower) skill level, and by their social origin, or
class, c ∈ {h, ℓ}, with h (ℓ) denoting that the worker comes from a socially
favoured (disadvantaged) background. To refer to the ability and class of worker
j ∈ [M,M + N), I write s(j) and c(j). The numbers nsc > 0, for s = a, b and
c = h, ℓ, denote the measures of workers with skill s originating from class c.
The measure of high- (low)- skilled workers is na = nah + naℓ (nb = nbh + nbℓ),
and the measure of socially favoured (disadvantaged) workers is nh = nah + nbh
(nℓ = naℓ + nbℓ). The population measures satisfy nah + naℓ + nbh + nbℓ = N and
Assumption 1 nah/nh > naℓ/nℓ .
Assumption 1 states that, while there are individuals of both skills in both social
groups, the share of high-ability workers is larger in the socially favoured group
than in the disadvantaged group. In view of Assumption 1, it is apparent that
social background is not the only interpretation of the variable “class”. More
broadly, this variable can represent any characteristic which is not itself ability,
but which, in the population as a whole, is correlated with ability or performance
at the workplace.
As a student, before entering the workplace, each worker is given a grade G ∈
{A,B}, with G(j) denoting the grade given to worker j ∈ [M,M + N). The
grade A (B) is meant to express that the student with this grade is of high (low)
ability. Grading policy is captured by the fraction γ, 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1, of students with
ability b who nevertheless obtain grade A. Thus, a positive value of γ means
that grades are inflated, while γ = 0 indicates “honest” grading. This modelling
choice is simplified in two respects. Firstly, the converse of grade inflation would
be that some truly excellent students are awarded only grade B. Such “grade
deflation” does not seem to be a realistic case and is so ruled out for simplicity.
Secondly, the extent of grade inflation is assumed to be the same throughout the
student population, irrespective of social class. This assumption captures the
idea that systematic discrimination along social origins inside the classroom will
be detected by students, and so can be ruled out legally.
6
Combining grade and social origin, the set of workers is partitioned into four
subsets. Depending on the grade inflation parameter γ, the measure of workers
with grade G originating from class c is denoted by NGc(γ), for G = A,B and
c = h, ℓ. One has
NAc(γ) = nac + γnbc for c = h, ℓ , (1)
NBc(γ) = (1− γ)nbc for c = h, ℓ , (2)
and the total measure of students with grade G = A,B is denoted by NG =
NGh +NGℓ.
Firms. The technology is described by two production functions fs : [0,M)→
R+, for s = a, b, which are twice continuously differentiable. The value fs(i) gives
the aggregate output produced by the firms in the interval [0, i) if all of them
employ a worker of skill s. Correspondingly, the derivative f ′s(i) describes the
output produced by firm i if its job is taken by a worker of ability s. The
production functions satisfy
Assumption 2 (a) f ′′s (i) < 0 for s = a, b and for all i ∈ [0,M),
(b) f ′a(i) > f
′
b(i) > 0 for all i ∈ [0,M),
(c) f ′′a (i)− f
′′
b (i) < 0 for all i ∈ [0,M).
Assumption 2 (a) states that firms are labelled in decreasing order of productiv-
ity. Such differences in productivity across firms can, for example, reflect different
endowments of capital, different entrepreneurial abilities of the firms’ owners, or
different technologies. As expressed in Assumption 2 (b), workers of both skill
levels are productive, but every firm produces more output with a high ability
than with a low ability worker. Finally, Assumption 2 (c) requires that the dif-
ference in output produced by workers of both skills decreases with the index of
the firm. This means that skill differences matter more in highly productive than
in less productive firms. This assumption formalises the idea that a firm with a
sophisticated technology, high capital endowment, or a capable management can
put employees’ skills to more productive uses than a firm lacking such comple-
mentary inputs. In short, Assumption 2 requires that the marginal product of
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labour is decreasing (a), that high-ability workers have an absolute advantage in
all firms (b), but that high (low) ability workers have a comparative advantage
in high (low) productivity firms (c).
Firms cannot observe the true skill level s. They do observe, however, the grade
G and the social origin c of the student as well as the aggregate extent of grade
inflation γ. To motivate this informational structure, notice that it is funda-
mentally difficult for an outsider to assess the validity of an individual student’s
grade, whereas the aggregate grading policy may be known due to reputation
effects. Moreover, it seems plausible that a personnel manager can quite easily
find out about the social background of a job applicant, say by observing the
name, address, manners, clothing, parents’ occupation, etc. Based on (1) and (2)
one finds the posterior probability Prob{s|G(j), c(j); γ} that worker j is of skill
s = a, b, conditional on her grade G(j) and class c(j). For the high skill level
these probabilities are, for c = h, ℓ, given by
Prob{a|A, c; γ} =
nac
NAc(γ)
=
nac
nac + γnbc
def.
= ρc(γ) , (3)
Prob{a|B, c; γ} = 0 , (4)
and for the low skill level they are Prob{b|A, c; γ} = 1−ρc(γ) and Prob{b|B, c; γ} =
1 for c = h, ℓ. Notice that the grade B fully reveals ability b, so that social class
does not matter for students with a B. Hence, there remain only the three signals
(A, h), (A, ℓ), B which distinguish workers from the point of view of the firms.
The probabilities in (3) and (4) are used to evaluate the expected output
ϕ(i, j; γ) =
∑
s=a,b
Prob{s|G(j), c(j); γ} · f ′s(i) (5)
worker j will produce in firm i if only her signal (G(j), c(j)) is known. For a
student j with grade G(j) = A, from (3), this reduces to
ϕ(i, j; γ) = ρc(j)f
′
a(i) + (1− ρc(j))f
′
b(i) . (6)
A student j with grade G(j) = B is recognised as being of low ability and hence
will be attributed the expected output
ϕ(i, j; γ) = f ′b(i) . (7)
8
Matching. In order to describe the matching between workers and firms, it is
convenient to re-arrange the names of workers after grading has occurred so that
all workers with signal (A, h) are collected in the interval JAh
def.
= [M,M +NAh),
all workers with signal (A, ℓ) are located in JAℓ
def.
= [M +NAh,M +NA), and all
workers with signal B are placed in the interval JB
def.
= [M+NA,M+N). Writing
λ for the Lebesgue-measure defined for the Borel-sets contained in [0,M +N), a
feasible matching between firms and workers is then defined as follows.
Definition 1 A feasible matching is a Lebesgue-measurable function µ : [0,M +
N)→ [0,M +N) such that
(a) µ(µ(k)) = k for all k ∈ [0,M +N),
(b) µ(i) ∈ [M,M +N) ∪ {i} for all i ∈ [0,M),
µ(j) ∈ [0,M) ∪ {j} for all j ∈ [M,M +N),
(c) for all Lebesgue-measurable sets K ⊂ [0,M+N), it holds λ(µ(K)) = λ(K).
Definition 1 (a) imposes bilateral consistency on the matching function, stating
that one’s partner’s partner is oneself. Part (b) of Definition 1 formalises the
two-sidedness of the matching between firms and workers. If a firm i ∈ [0,M)
has a partner, then this must be a worker j ∈ [M,M + N), and vice versa. If
an agent k is unmatched I write µ(k) = k. Finally, Definition 1 (c) says that for
any set K of agents, the set of their partners must be of equal measure. This
expresses, in the context of an atomless agent space, the idea that each firm offers
just one job and each worker works in (at most) one firm. Requirement (c) is thus
a market clearing condition stating that the matches formed must be feasible in
the aggregate.
Stable assignment. Payoffs πi and ωj of firms and workers are generated
from the matching function µ together with a wage function w : [0,M) → R+
describing for each firm i ∈ [0,M) the wage w(i) it pays. If a firm has a partner,
i.e., if µ(i) 6= i for some i ∈ [0,M), its payoff is the expected output according to
(5) net of the wage paid,
πi = ϕ(i, µ(i); γ)− w(i) . (8)
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If a worker has a job, i.e., if µ(j) 6= j for some j ∈ [M,M +N), then her payoff
is the wage paid by her employer,
ωj = w(µ(j)) . (9)
The payoffs of unmatched agents are set to zero, that is for all i ∈ [0,M) or
j ∈ [M,M +N) with µ(i) = i or µ(j) = j, one has πi = 0 and ωj = 0.
Definition 2 A stable assignment is a feasible matching µ, a wage function w :
[0,M) → R+ and payoffs πi for all i ∈ [0,M) and ωj for all j ∈ [M,M + N)
generated by µ and w such that
(a) πi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ [0,M) and ωj ≥ 0 for all j ∈ [M,M +N)
(b) πi + ωj ≥ ϕ(i, j; γ) for all i ∈ [0,M) and j ∈ [M,M +N).
Part (a) of Definition 2 is an individual rationality constraint stating that no
agent does worse in the matching than she would do by staying alone. Definition
2 (b) requires that the sum of the payoffs of any firm and any worker, whether
matched together or not, is at least as large as the output this pair could produce
together. This condition says that no pair has the potential to improve on their
payoffs by matching together. An assignment is thus stable if there is no profitable
unilateral or bilateral deviation from the allocation it induces.
In the following section, the set of stable assignments in the labour market is
characterised.
3 The Labour Market
The first two results show how the information conveyed by grade and social
origin determines the matching between workers and firms.
Proposition 1 (Sorting of workers). Consider γ > 0 and let a stable assign-
ment (µ, w) be given. Then for any two workers j, j′ who are matched to firms,
µ(j) 6= j and µ(j′) 6= j′, and who satisfy (a) j ∈ JAh and j
′ ∈ JAℓ ∪ JB or (b)
j ∈ JAh ∪ JAℓ and j
′ ∈ JB, it holds µ(j) ≤ µ(j
′).
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Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 1 implies that the three signals (A, h), (A, ℓ), and B partition workers
in a three-layer hierarchy, with A-students from the higher social class forming
the top layer, A-students from the lower social class forming the middle layer, and
B-students from both classes forming the bottom layer. Whenever one encounters
two employed workers with differing signals, in a stable assignment, the worker
from the higher layer necessarily must hold the more productive job.
While this proposition characterises the relative position of individual workers,
it does not say anything about how many workers are employed and how many
jobs can be filled. These issues are addressed in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 (Filled jobs and vacancies). Consider γ > 0 and let a stable
assignment (µ, w) be given. Then almost all firms i < N are matched to workers
and almost all workers are matched to firms i < N , with the more productive
firms employing the workers with the better signals, and almost all firms i ≥ N
are unmatched:
(a) λ({i ∈ [0, NAh) |µ(i) ∈ JAh}) = λ({j ∈ JAh |µ(j) ∈ [0, NAh)}) = NAh ,
(b) λ({i ∈ [NAh, NA) |µ(i) ∈ JAℓ}) = λ({j ∈ JAℓ |µ(j) ∈ [NAh, NA)}) = NAℓ ,
(c) λ({i ∈ [NA, N) |µ(i) ∈ JB}) = λ({j ∈ JB |µ(j) ∈ [NA, N)}) = NB ,
(d) λ({i ∈ [N,M) |µ(i) = i}) = M −N .
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 2 states that in a stable assignment the labour market must be
cleared. Since the measure of workers N is less than the measure of firms M ,
market clearing entails that there remains a set of measure M − N of vacant
jobs. Moreover, the allocation of workers to firms respects the hierarchy of sig-
nals as stated in Proposition 1. Thus, the NAh most productive jobs go to the
students with grade A originating from the favoured social class; the next NAℓ
somewhat less productive firms employ workers from the middle layer composed
of the lower-class A-students; in the following NB even less productive firms stu-
dents with the grade B are active; and finally, the M − N least productive jobs
11
Figure 1: Matching in a stable assignment.
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remain unfilled. This matching pattern is induced by the function
µ(k) =


M + k if 0 ≤ k < N
k if N ≤ k < M
k −M if M ≤ k < M +N ,
illustrated in Figure 1, which provides an example for a feasible matching function
satisfying Definition 1 and displaying the properties described in Propositions 1
and 2.
Turning now to the wages, I first compare the wages of two individual employed
workers sharing the same signal.
Proposition 3 (Equal pay for equal signal). In a stable assignment with γ >
0, two employed workers with the same signal obtain the same wage: If j, j′ ∈ JS,
with S = Ah,Aℓ,B, and µ(j) 6= j, µ(j′) 6= j′, then w(µ(j)) = w(µ(j′))
def.
= wS(γ).
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Proof. From the definition of payoffs in (8) and (9) and the stability require-
ment in Definition 2 (b), one has
πµ(j) + ωj′ = ϕ(µ(j), j; γ)− w(µ(j)) + w(µ(j
′)) ≥ ϕ(µ(j), j′; γ) . (10)
Since both workers share the same signal, j, j′ ∈ JS, expected output would
be the same if they worked both in the same firm µ(j), i.e., ϕ(µ(j), j′; γ) =
ϕ(µ(j), j; γ). Hence, the inequality in (10) implies w(µ(j′)) ≥ w(µ(j)). From the
stability requirement πµ(j′) +ωj ≥ ϕ(µ(j
′), j; γ) one derives in the same way that
w(µ(j)) ≥ w(µ(j′)). Altogether, one must have w(µ(j)) = w(µ(j′)).
As Proposition 3 shows, in a stable assignment, the market treats workers fairly
in the sense that any two workers which convey the same signal about their
productivity earn the same wage. In a context of incomplete information created
by grade inflation, however, identical signals need not mean identical productivity,
and differing signals need not mean different productivities. Thus, a low skilled
student who was lucky to obtain an A will be treated like a high skilled student
from the same social origin. Similarly, an able student from the lower social class
will not receive the same wage as an able student from the higher class, although
they both have exactly the same skills.
The following proposition quantifies the signal-specific wages obtained in a stable
assignment.
Proposition 4 (Wages). In a stable assignment with γ > 0, wages are
(a) wB(γ) = f
′
b(N)
def.
= wB
(b) wAℓ(γ) = wB + ρℓ(γ)[f
′
a(NA)− f
′
b(NA)]
(c) wAh(γ) = wAℓ(γ) + [ρh(γ)− ρℓ(γ)][f
′
a(NAh)− f
′
b(NAh)]
Proof. See Appendix.
According to Proposition 4 (a) and (b), the students with signal (A, ℓ) obtain a
wage premium compared to the students with the bad grade B. This premium
expresses the market valuation of the better grade and is therefore called the
grade premium: GRA (γ)
def.
= ρℓ(γ)[f
′
a(NA(γ))− f
′
b(NA(γ))] . (11)
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Its value is determined by the productivity differential of the last A-student times
the probability that this student is in fact of high ability. Since high ability
students are more productive than low ability students (Assumption 2 b), the
grade premium is positive for all 0 < γ ≤ 1.
Similarly, from Proposition 4 (b) and (c), the A-students originating from the
higher social class obtain a wage premium relative to the lower class A-students,
called the
social premium: SOC (γ)
def.
= [ρh(γ)− ρℓ(γ)][f
′
a(NAh(γ))− f
′
b(NAh(γ))] .(12)
Assumption 1 implies that ρh(γ) > ρℓ(γ) if γ > 0. With Assumption 2 (b) it then
follows that the social premium is strictly positive if γ > 0. This shows that, in a
situation where grades are inflated, employers interpret a favourable social origin
as an additional signal for high ability. In the market, this valuation by firms is
cashed in by the higher class A-students in the form of a wage differential relative
to their lower class counterparts. Its value is the product of the productivity
differential between both skill levels, evaluated at the last (A, h)-student, times
the difference in posteriors attached to A-students of both classes. It so expresses
by how much the expected productivity of a higher-class A-student exceeds the
one of a lower-class A-student.
The premia are illustrated in Figure 2. There, the upper (lower) bold line gives
the expected output of a higher (lower) class worker with grade A. The grade
premium is such that the last firm able to hire an A-student, i.e., firm i = NA, is
indifferent between hiring this student and a student of low ability. Geometrically,
the grade premium is then the difference between the lower bold curve and the
marginal product f ′b, both evaluated at NA. Similarly, the social premium is
determined by the choice of the last firm able to find an upper class student with
an A, i.e., firm i = NAh. This firm must be indifferent between hiring such a
student and an A-student from the disfavoured origin. The difference between
the expected productivities of these two students, geometrically expressed by the
vertical jump between both bold curves occurring at NAh, is the social premium.
To conclude this section, a remark is in order concerning the behaviour of the
model when γ = 0. With honest grading, the three signals collapse to two which
are exclusively defined by the grades A and B. This occurs because in this case,
14
Figure 2: Wages in a stable assignment.
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the grade A fully reveals high ability so that there is no reason to differentiate
workers with this grade according to social origin. Because of this discontinuity,
Propositions 1 to 4 cannot literally be extended to γ = 0. However, one can
easily state modified versions of these propositions for this case, with the wage
for the high grade being wA = wB + f
′
a(na) − f
′
b(na). Now the grade premium
converges to f ′a(na)− f
′
b(na) and the social premium converges to zero if γ → 0.
Hence, the wages are continuous at γ = 0, even though the underlying matching
need not be.
In the following section, it is analysed how the wages are affected by changes in
the grade inflation parameter, and which students benefit from such changes.
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4 Winners and Losers From Grade Inflation
Using Proposition 4, one can derive the expected wages wsc, s = a, b and c = ℓ, h,
obtained by the four different types of workers in the economy. Since students
with a high ability certainly obtain grade A, the wage of high ability students
originating from social class c = h, ℓ is the wage paid to A-students from this
class, wac(γ) = wAc(γ). For low ability students the expected wage is a weighted
average of the wage obtained by B- and by A-students of the corresponding origin,
wbc(γ) = (1− γ)wB + γwAc(γ) for c = ℓ, h.
In order to analyse which group, if any, benefits from a deviation from honest
grading, I consider for each type (s, c), for s = a, b and c = h, ℓ, the grade inflation
parameter γsc
def.
= argmaxγ{wsc(γ)|0 ≤ γ ≤ 1} which is most preferred by this
type. In order to characterise the preferred grading policies, the following deriva-
tives (13) to (16) which can straightforwardly be calculated from Proposition 4
are useful.
w′aℓ(γ) = GRA
′(γ) (13)
w′bℓ(γ) = γGRA
′(γ) + GRA(γ) (14)
w′ah(γ) = GRA
′(γ) + SOC′(γ) (15)
w′bh(γ) = γ[GRA
′(γ) + SOC′(γ)] + [GRA(γ) + SOC(γ)] (16)
Consider first the low-ability students of both social origins. When determining
her preferred grading policy, such a student faces a trade-off between two effects of
an increase in grade inflation expressed by the two terms on the right-hand-sides
of (14) and (16). On the one hand, with increased grade inflation, it becomes more
likely that this student obtains an undeserved A, and so it becomes more likely
that she receives the grade premium and, if she is of the higher class, the social
premium (the second terms in (14) and (16)). Since the premia are positive, from
this effect low ability students would like to see more grade inflation. On the other
hand, the premia themselves are affected if more workers with grade A enter the
labour market (the first terms in (14) and (16)). Low ability students care about
this effect since, in a situation with grade inflation, they sometimes also obtain
an A. Therefore, also low ability students do not necessarily want to push grade
inflation ever further. If in the initial situation grading is honest, however, the
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second effect is not relevant since a low ability student does not get any premium
in the first place. By consequence, at γ = 0 the positive effect dominates so that
a little grade inflation is always beneficial for low skilled students.
Turning now to the high ability students from the lower social class, one sees
from (13) that their preference is determined by the change in the grade pre-
mium GRA′(γ) induced by stronger grade inflation. This change occurs through
two channels. Firstly, when employers assess an A-student, they attach a lower
posterior to her being of truly high skill, ρ′ℓ(γ) < 0, since there are more low
ability students in the pool of those who are awarded an A. Secondly, from
Assumption 2 (c), also the productivity differential f ′a(NA) − f
′
b(NA) decreases
since the total number NA of A-students increases. Thus, through both chan-
nels, the grade premium is eroded if grades are inflated, GRA′(γ) < 0 for all
0 ≤ γ ≤ 1. This implies that any increase in grade inflation makes the able,
lower class students definitely worse off.
In order to assess, finally, the preferences of the high skilled students from
favourable backgrounds, consider an example where nah = naℓ = 1/4, nbh =
0, nbℓ = 1/2, and fa(i) − fb(i) = ln(i + 1). In this example, one finds wah(0) =
wB + 2/3 whereas wah(1) = wB + 7/10. Thus, full grade inflation is preferred
by these agents to honest grading; indeed, by some (tedious) computing, one
finds for this example w′ah(γ) > 0 for all 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 so that γah = 1 is in fact
the optimum. By continuity, this corner solution remains valid even after small
perturbations of the parameters, notably so that nbh > 0.
The following proposition summarises these results.
Proposition 5 (Preferences for grade inflation).
(a) Low ability students always prefer some grade inflation, γbc > 0 for both
c = h, ℓ.
(b) High-ability students from a disfavoured background prefer honest grading,
γaℓ = 0.
(c) There are production functions fs, s = a, b, and population shares nsc, for
s = a, b and c = h, ℓ, satisfying Assumptions 1 and 2, such that γah = 1.
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While the first two results in Proposition 5 correspond to intuition and probably
to the experience of most teachers, part (c) is rather surprising. It states that
high ability students of favourable origin, which one may call the “elite”, may
opt for full grade inflation. Just like the able students from the lower class,
these students suffer from an erosion of the grade premium, and would, from this
effect alone, oppose grade inflation. However, grade inflation allows the high class
students to obtain the social premium which is absent with honest grading. The
example presented above shows that this second effect can over-compensate the
erosion of the grade premium so that grade inflation is beneficial for the “elite”.
To understand the economic forces driving this result, notice that the high-class,
high-ability ah-students face two kinds of competition on the labour market,
from the low ability, high-class bh-students and from the high-ability, low-class
aℓ-students. Grade inflation induces employers to confound the ah-students with
the bh-students, so that for the ah-students, competition by bh-students is exac-
erbated by grade inflation. With honest grading, on the other hand, employers
recognise that the aℓ-students are just as productive as the ah-students. Hon-
est grading therefore raises the number of students who display the best signal
available in the market and thereby depresses the wage obtainable by the ah-
students who hold this signal. Put differently, grade inflation shields the highly
skilled students with upper class backgrounds from competition by the equally
able students originating from disadvantaged social classes. Consequently, from
this effect alone, the ah-students would prefer grade inflation. When ah-students
choose their most preferred grading policy, they have to figure out whose competi-
tion is more harmful for them. As the example shows, this may be the aℓ-group,
in particular when the number of these students is very large relative to the
number of bh-students.
In addition to type-specific preferences for grade inflation as analysed in Propo-
sition 5, one might as well be interested in the overall impact of grade inflation
on a social class. Specifically, one might wonder whether lenient grading helps
or hurts the students from disfavoured backgrounds. To address this question,
define
Wc(γ)
def.
= nacwac(γ) + nbcwbc(γ) (17)
as the aggregate wage income received by workers from social origin c = h, ℓ.
18
Proposition 6 (Grade inflation and social origin).
The aggregate wage of lower class workers strictly decreases if grades are inflated
more strongly:
W ′ℓ(γ) < 0 for all 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 .
Proof. Replacing waℓ(γ) = wAℓ(γ) and wbℓ(γ) = γwAℓ + (1 − γ)wB with the
help of Proposition 4 and using (3), equation (17) becomesWℓ(γ) = naℓ[f
′
a(NA)−
f ′b(NA)] + nℓwB. Noting ∂NA/∂γ = nb, differentiating yields
∂Wℓ(γ)
∂γ
= naℓnb[f
′′
a (NA)− f
′′
b (NA)] < 0 ,
with the sign following on Assumption 2 (c).
Proposition 6 says that grade inflation unambiguously hurts the lower classes, and
that, consequently, honest grading is optimal if one wants to promote the welfare
of socially disadvantaged students. At the heart of this result is the informational
structure of the present model. Lower class students are less able on average, so
that one might think that camouflaging academic performance by inflated grades
allows these students to grasp some jobs which otherwise would be reserved to
students with proven skills. This argument, however, misses the fact that social
origin is observable irrespective of the grading scheme. Thus, employers cannot
be fooled into disregarding the lower average ability of disadvantaged students.
The only result achieved by grade inflation is that the assessment of abilities is
distributed differently among the lower class students. The low-ability students
from this class gain by grade inflation, but this gain comes exclusively at the
expense of the high ability students of the same background. In addition, grade
inflation reduces the wage for students with good grades, so that wage income is
not only redistributed among the lower class agents but decreases overall.
So far, the analysis was restricted to highlighting the preferences of the individual
subgroups of the student population. In the following, I give some hints as to
what grading policy might actually be chosen. Clearly, the answer to this ques-
tion strongly depends on the political institution governing the choice of grading
policies. In this respect, in the present paper only a first step is attempted, by
restricting attention to median voter results. That is, the students, or, more
realistically, the parents who care for their offspring vote on alternative grading
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schemes γ. The decision is given by a Condorcet winner, i.e., a grading scheme γ
such that no other grading scheme γ′ gains a majority in a pairwise vote between
γ and γ′.
For this part of the analysis, it is convenient to define the elasticities of the grade
premium and the social premium by α(γ)
def.
= γGRA′(γ)/GRA(γ) and σ(γ)
def.
=
γSOC′(γ)/SOC(γ). These elasticities measure how strongly both premia react
to an increase in grade inflation. Since the grade premium necessarily decreases
with grade inflation, α(γ) < 0. The elasticity of the social premium, however,
may have both signs, depending on the initial value of γ and the curvature of the
production functions.
Proposition 7 (Voting).
(a) The grading scheme γbℓ preferred by the low-ability, low-class students is
the Condorcet winner in a vote among students if nb > N/2, nℓ > N/2, and
σ(γ) > −1 for all γ ≤ γbℓ.
(b) The grading scheme γah preferred by the high-ability, high-class students is
the Condorcet winner in a vote among students if na > N/2, nh > N/2,
and for all γ ≤ γah,
GRA(γ)
SOC(γ)
> −
1− 1− γγ σ(γ)
1− 1− γγ α(γ)
(18)
Proof of Proposition 7. See Appendix.
In case (a) of Proposition 7 the low ability, low class students of type (b, ℓ) decide
on the extent of grade inflation. Depending on the alternative, they achieve this
by the support of either the (a, ℓ)- or the (b, h)-students, provided that each of
these groups forms a majority together with the (b, ℓ)-students. To see why,
remember that the (a, ℓ)-students are strictly worse off by any increase in grade
inflation and so always vote for the lower grade inflation parameter on offer.
Thus, they will vote for γbℓ if the alternative γ
′ is larger. When the alternative
γ′ is smaller than γbℓ, the (b, ℓ)-students will be supported by the (b, h)-students
provided that these prefer at least as much grade inflation as the (b, ℓ)-students.
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Now the wages of these two groups differ in that the (b, h)-students obtain the
social premium with probability γ. A marginal increase in γ is therefore valued
higher by the (b, h)-students than by the (b, ℓ)-students if the expected social
premium γSOC(γ) increases in γ. This is the case if the social premium decreases
less than proportionally in γ, or equivalently, if the elasticity of the social premium
σ(γ) is larger than−1. Then, the (b, h)-students are even more enthusiastic about
inflating grades than the (b, ℓ)-students.
Case (b) of Proposition 7 shows that in some circumstances also the “elite”
(a, h)-students can impose their preferred grade inflation democratically. Like
the (b, ℓ)-students in case (a), they build on the support by the (a, ℓ)-students
whenever some γ′ is proposed which exceeds their most preferred grade inflation
γah. If a smaller alternative γ
′ is on the ballot then the (b, h)-students vote for γah
provided that these students like grade inflation at least as much as the (a, h)-
students. Condition (18) ensures that this is the case. Although this condition
looks rather involved, it is actually not very strong. The interesting case here is
the situation where the social premium increases with increasing grade inflation,
so that σ(γ) > 0. In this case the right-hand-side of (18) may turn positive and
so the condition (18) might fail. To avoid this, in essence, the elasticity of the
social premium σ(γ) must not be too large. That means that the social premium
does not increase too fast with increasing grade inflation. Otherwise, with a fast
increasing social premium, the (a, h)-students who obtain the social premium
with certainty might benefit even more by increasing grade inflation than the
(b, h)-students who obtain the premium only with probability γ.
The assumptions used to show Proposition 7 are quite special – an observation
which is not uncommon for median voter results. Thus, this proposition does
not attempt to fully characterise the outcome of a democratic choice of grading
policies. Rather it serves to highlight which groups of students may form potential
political coalitions. In both cases, preferences for grading policies do not only
follow the obvious split according to ability, but can as well be aligned according
to social origin. Specifically, as case (b) shows, the high-ability high-class students
may join forces with their low ability counterparts of the same social origin so as
to impose some grade inflation which hurts the high ability, low class students.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper, it was analysed how a grading policy which awards good grades
to mediocre students affects the labour market. It was shown that such grade
inflation benefits students of low ability, but that it hurts students from disadvan-
taged social backgrounds. Moreover, grade inflation may benefit students from
favoured social origins because it devalues the good grades earned by aspiring
lower class students, thereby reducing competition for attractive jobs. For edu-
cation policy, these results suggest that lenient grading is not a suitable means for
promoting equality of opportunities. Quite the contrary, a strictly meritocratic
system where performance is measured and documented objectively is the best
way to induce social mobility.
These results were derived in a model of two-sided matching between firms and
workers. This approach, which provides a microeconomic foundation for the al-
locative role of grades, lends itself to a number of extensions, two of which I briefly
discuss. Firstly, it seems natural to extend the model of a centralised grading
authority presented in the present paper to a model where several schools, or
school districts, set their own grading policies. In such a model one could an-
swer questions such as whether decentralised grades are necessarily, as is often
claimed, less stringent than centrally chosen grades, or whether decentralisation
hurts low ability and/or lower class students. As a second extension, one might
consider to integrate the matching model with a signalling approach where the
grading policy of the schooling system is not observable. It would be an interest-
ing, though challenging, task to find out whether honest grading can survive in
an equilibrium in such a model.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Write i = µ(j) and i′ = µ(j′). From Definition 2
(b), stability requires πi+ωj′ ≥ ϕ(i, j
′; γ) and πi′ +ωj ≥ ϕ(i
′, j; γ). Replacing the
payoffs by (8) and (9) and using the bilateral consistency requirements µ(i) = j
and µ(i′) = j′ according to Definition 1 (a) shows that these two inequalities are
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equivalent to ϕ(i, j; γ)−w(i) +w(i′) ≥ ϕ(i, j′; γ) and ϕ(i′, j′; γ)−w(i′) +w(i) ≥
ϕ(i′, j; γ). Adding these inequalities, one arrives at
ϕ(i, j; γ) + ϕ(i′, j′; γ) ≥ ϕ(i, j′; γ) + ϕ(i′, j; γ) . (A.1)
One has either G(j) = A and G(j′) = B or G(j) = G(j′) = A and c(j) = h,
c(j′) = ℓ. Starting with the first possibility and using (6) and (7), one finds
ϕ(i, j; γ) = ρc(j)f
′
a(i) + (1− ρc(j))f
′
b(i) ,
ϕ(i′, j′; γ) = f ′b(i
′) ,
ϕ(i, j′; γ) = f ′b(i) ,
ϕ(i′, j; γ) = ρc(j)f
′
a(i
′) + (1− ρc(j))f
′
b(i
′) .
Inserting these in (A.1) yields ρc(j)[f
′
a(i) − f
′
b(i)] ≥ ρc(j)[f
′
a(i
′) − f ′b(i
′)]. From
ρc(j) > 0 and Assumption 2 (c), this implies i ≤ i
′.
Turning now to the second possibility and using G(j) = G(j′) = A and c(j) = h,
c(j′) = ℓ in (6), one obtains
ϕ(i, j; γ) = ρhf
′
a(i) + (1− ρh)f
′
b(i) ,
ϕ(i′, j′; γ) = ρℓf
′
a(i
′) + (1− ρℓ)f
′
b(i
′) ,
ϕ(i, j′; γ) = ρℓf
′
a(i) + (1− ρℓ)f
′
b(i) ,
ϕ(i′, j; γ) = ρhf
′
a(i
′) + (1− ρh)f
′
b(i
′) .
Inserting these expressions, one derives that (A.1) is equivalent to
ρhf
′
a(i) + (1− ρh)f
′
b(i) + ρℓf
′
a(i
′) + (1− ρℓ)f
′
b(i
′)
≥ ρℓf
′
a(i) + (1− ρℓ)f
′
b(i) + ρhf
′
a(i
′) + (1− ρh)f
′
b(i
′) .
After replacing ρh and ρℓ with the help of (3), this inequality is equivalent to
nahf
′
a(i) + γnbhf
′
b(i)
nah + γnbh
+
naℓf
′
a(i
′) + γnbℓf
′
b(i
′)
naℓ + γnbℓ
≥
naℓf
′
a(i) + γnbℓf
′
b(i)
naℓ + γnbℓ
+
nahf
′
a(i
′) + γnbhf
′
b(i
′)
nah + γnbh
.
Cross-multiplying the denominators, one finds that this is further equivalent to
[nahf
′
a(i) + γnbhf
′
b(i)](naℓ + γnbℓ) + [naℓf
′
a(i
′) + γnbℓf
′
b(i
′)](nah + γnbh)
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≥ [naℓf
′
a(i) + γnbℓf
′
b(i)](nah + γnbh) + [nahf
′
a(i
′) + γnbhf
′
b(i
′)](naℓ + γnbℓ)
⇐⇒ γnahnbℓf
′
a(i) + γnbhnaℓf
′
b(i) + γnbhnaℓf
′
a(i
′) + γnahnbℓf
′
b(i
′)
≥ γnbhnaℓf
′
a(i) + γnahnbℓf
′
b(i) + γnahnbℓf
′
a(i
′) + γnbhnaℓf
′
b(i
′) .
Collecting terms, one arrives at
γ(nahnbℓ − nbhnaℓ)[f
′
a(i)− f
′
b(i)] ≥ γ(nahnbℓ − nbhnaℓ)[f
′
a(i
′)− f ′b(i
′)] . (A.2)
From Assumption 1, one has nahnbℓ > nbhnaℓ. With γ > 0 it follows that (A.2)
is equivalent to f ′a(i)− f
′
b(i) ≥ f
′
a(i
′)− f ′b(i
′). From Assumption 2 (c), this again
implies i ≤ i′.
Proof of Proposition 2. I first prove that almost all firms i < N are matched
to workers,
λ({i ∈ [0, N) |µ(i) ∈ [M,M +N)}) = N . (A.3)
Assume that (A.3) false. Then there is a set of firms I ⊂ [0, N) with positive
measure λ(I) > 0 such that µ(I) ∩ [M,M + N) = ∅. Notice that this implies
µ(i) = i and hence πi = 0 for all i ∈ I. From the feasibility requirement in
Definition 1 (c), there must be a set of workers J ⊂ [M,M+N) of equal measure
λ(J) = λ(I) who are not matched to firms in [0, N), i.e., µ(J) ∩ [0, N) = ∅, and
hence µ(J) ⊂ J ∪ [N,M). Thus, there must be a worker j ∈ J who has no job,
µ(j) = j, or who is matched to a firm µ(j) ∈ [N,M).
Consider first the possibility µ(j) = j. This implies ωj = 0. Since for any
i ∈ I, one has πi = 0, the stability requirement in Definition 2 (b) implies
0 = πi + ωj ≥ ϕ(i, j; γ). Since expected output must be strictly positive from
Assumption 2 (b), one arrives at a contradiction.
Consider now the possibility µ(j) ∈ [N,M). Individual rationality in Definition
2 (a) implies πµ(j) = ϕ(µ(j), j; γ) − w(µ(j)) ≥ 0. For any i ∈ I, one must then
have πi + ωj = 0 + w(µ(j)) ≤ ϕ(µ(j), j; γ). Moreover, since i < N ≤ µ(j), it
follows from Assumption 2 (a) that ϕ(µ(j), j; γ) < ϕ(i, j; γ). Hence, one arrives
at πi+ωj < ϕ(i, j; γ), contradicting the stability requirement in Definition 2 (b).
This establishes (A.3).
(a) The first equality follows from noting that by bilateral consistency in Def-
inition 1 (a), {j ∈ JAh |µ(j) ∈ [0, NAh)} = µ({i ∈ [0, NAh) |µ(i) ∈ JAh}) and
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hence, from feasibility in Definition 1 (c), both sets must have equal measure.
Assume that this measure is strictly less than NAh. Then from (A.3), there is
a set I ⊂ [0, NAh) with positive measure λ(I) > 0 such that µ(I) ⊂ JAℓ ∪ JB.
Thus, there must be a set J ⊂ JAh of workers with the same measure λ(J) = λ(I)
who cannot find a partner among the firms i ∈ [0, NAh). From (A.3), almost all
of these workers are matched to some firms, and hence one can choose j ∈ J
such that µ(j) ∈ [NAh, N). Choose in addition i ∈ I with the partner µ(i).
Both workers µ(i) and j are matched to firms. Moreover, it holds j ∈ JAh and
µ(i) ∈ JAℓ ∪ JB. From Proposition 1 (a), this implies µ(j) ≤ µ(µ(i)) = i. How-
ever, since i ∈ I ⊂ [0, NAh) and µ(j) ∈ [NAh, N), one also has i < NAh ≤ µ(j), a
contradiction.
(b) and (c) The proofs of claims (b) and (c) parallel the one of claim (a) and
so are omitted for brevity.
(d) From (A.3) and market clearing in Definition 1 (c), there is at most a
zero measure set of workers left for the firms i ∈ [N,M), λ({i ∈ [N,M) |µ(i) ∈
[M,M +N)}) = 0. The complement set of unmatched firms must therefore have
full measure, λ({i ∈ [N,M) |µ(i) = i}) =M −N .
Proof of Proposition 4. (a) From Proposition 2 (c), there exists a sequence
of firms i ∈ [NA, N) such that all i in the sequence are matched to workers
µ(i) ∈ JB and such that the sequence converges to N . From Proposition 3,
for all those i, one has w(i) = wB(γ). Individual rationality in Definition 2
(a) requires for all those i that πi = ϕ(i, µ(i); γ) − w(i) = f
′
b(i) − wB(γ) ≥ 0,
where the second equality follows from (7). Taking the limit as i → N yields
wB(γ) ≤ f
′
b(N).
From Proposition 2 (d), one can find a sequence of unmatched firms i ∈ [N,M)
converging to N . Note that for all i in this sequence, one has πi = 0, and take
some j ∈ JB who is matched to a firm so that w(µ(j)) = wB(γ). Then, stability in
Definition 2 (b) implies together with (7): πi+ωj = 0+wB(γ) ≥ ϕ(i, j; γ) = f
′
b(i).
Taking the limit as i→ N , one finds wB(γ) ≥ f
′
b(N). Thus, wB(γ) = f
′
b(N).
(b) From Proposition 2 (b), there exists a sequence of firms i ∈ [NAh, NA) such
that all i in the sequence are matched to workers µ(i) ∈ JAℓ and such that the
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sequence converges to NA. From Proposition 3, all those firms pay the same wage
wAℓ(γ) and so obtain payoff πi = ϕ(i, µ(i); γ)−wAℓ(γ). Consider a worker j ∈ JB
who is matched to some firm and obtains payoff ωj = wB. From stability in
Definition 2 (b), one must have πi+ωj = ϕ(i, µ(i); γ)−wAℓ(γ)+wB ≥ ϕ(i, j; γ).
From this inequality, one derives with the help of (6), (7), and c(µ(i)) = ℓ that
wAℓ(γ) ≤ wB + ρℓ(γ)[f
′
a(i) − f
′
b(i)]. Taking the limit as i → NA, one arrives at
wAℓ(γ) ≤ wB + ρℓ(γ)[f
′
a(NA)− f
′
b(NA)].
From Proposition 2 (c), one can find a sequence of firms i ∈ [NA, N) such that all
i in the sequence are matched to workers µ(i) ∈ JB and such that the sequence
converges to NA. From Proposition 3, for all those i, one has πi = ϕ(i, µ(i); γ)−
wB. Consider some worker j ∈ JAℓ who has a job and so earns ωj = w(µ(j)) =
wAℓ(γ). Stability requires πi + ωj = ϕ(i, µ(i); γ) − wB + wAℓ(γ) ≥ ϕ(i, j; γ).
Inserting (7), (6), and c(j) = ℓ, one finds wAℓ(γ) ≥ wB + ρℓ(γ)[f
′
a(i)− f
′
b(i)]. In
the limit for i → NA, one so has wAℓ(γ) ≥ wB + ρℓ(γ)[f
′
a(NA) − f
′
b(NA)] which
establishes the claim.
(c) A similar argument as in the proof of claim (b) shows that ϕ(i, µ(i); γ)−
wAh(γ) +wAℓ(γ) ≥ ϕ(i, j; γ), where i ∈ [0, NAh) with µ(i) ∈ JAh is any firm from
a sequence converging to NAh, and the alternative worker is j ∈ JAℓ. Also, one
arrives at ϕ(i, µ(i); γ) − wAℓ(γ) + wAh(γ) ≥ ϕ(i, j; γ), where i ∈ [NAh, NA) with
µ(i) ∈ JAℓ is any firm from a sequence converging to NAh, and the alternative
worker is j ∈ JAh. The claim is established by inserting expected outputs and
taking the limit for i→ NAh in both inequalities.
Proof of Proposition 7. (a) Consider first a vote between γbℓ and some
γ′ > γbℓ. From w
′
aℓ(γ) < 0 for all γ ∈ [0, 1], the students of type aℓ prefer γbℓ over
γ′. This is obviously also true for the students of type bℓ. Together, these two
groups form a majority from nℓ = naℓ + nbℓ > N/2.
Alternatively, if some γ′ with 0 < γ′ < γbℓ is posted against γbℓ observe that from
SOC(γ) > 0, σ(γ) > −1 is equivalent to SOC(γ) + γSOC′(γ) > 0. From (14)
and (16), this inequality is equivalent to w′bh(γ) > w
′
bℓ(γ). Since this holds for all
γ′ ≤ γ ≤ γbℓ,
wbh(γbℓ)− wbh(γ
′) =
∫ γbℓ
γ′
w′bh(γ) dγ >
∫ γbℓ
γ′
w′bℓ(γ) dγ = wbℓ(γbℓ)− wbℓ(γ
′) ≥ 0 .
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Thus, all voters of type bh vote for γbℓ, as do obviously those of type bℓ. From
nb = nbℓ + nbh > N/2, this is a majority.
(b) As in case (a), the voters of type aℓ prefer γah to any alternative γ
′ > γah.
From nah + naℓ = na > N/2, in such a vote, γah obtains a majority of votes.
Consider then a vote between γ′ < γah and γah. Observing that GRA(γ) >
0, SOC(γ) > 0 and GRA′(γ) < 0, one finds that condition (18) is equivalent
to [GRA(γ) + SOC(γ)] + γ[GRA′(γ) + SOC′(γ)] > GRA′(γ) + SOC′(γ). From
(15) and (16), this is equivalent to w′bh(γ) > w
′
ah(γ). Since this holds for all
γ′ ≤ γ ≤ γah, voters of type bh prefer γah over γ
′. From nah + nbh = nh > N/2,
a majority of voters chooses γah in this pairwise vote.
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